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Setting Standards for ParentingmBy What Right? 
James G. Dwyer, PhD, JD 
Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law 
ABSTRACt .  Mental health professionals, like other professionals involved in family 
matters, feel constrained when advocating for the interests of children by the belief 
that parents are entitled to custody and control of their children's lives, regardless of 
what others may think of their parenting behavior, absent severe harm to the children. 
This belief is morally untenable, and the legal doctrine of parental rights that is its 
concrete mbodiment is inconsistent with other well-established legal principles and 
should be abandoned. Children alone should have legal rights in connection with their 
upbringing, and those rights should include an entitlement to much higher standards 
of parenting than the law presently imposes. 
KEY WORDS: Parents' Rights; Children's Rights; Parenting Standards; Child Advo- 
cacy. 
By what authority may child development experts propose, and the 
state adopt, standards for parenting? The traditional view in our cul- 
ture, and the current law regarding parenting in this country, is that 
parents have a right to raise their biological offspring and to do so as 
they see fit, absent clear and convincing evidence of severe harm to 
the children. For 'experts' and state authorities to impose more than 
the most minimal requirements onparents, many would argue, is to 
violate this right of parents. 
This norm is so pervasive that it colors the work of mental health 
professionals involved in family court proceedings concerning cus- 
tody, visitation, abuse, and neglect of children. For example, although 
psychologists are asked to provide only psychological evaluations of 
family members, they routinely make recommendations regarding 
parental involvement in a child's life based on whether they have 
found sufficient evidence to meet his legal standard for termination 
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of parental rights. Rarely if ever does a psychologist recommend ter- 
minating a parent-child relationship simply because the child would, 
on the whole, be better off if the court did so. Yet such is frequently 
the case even when the parent's conduct has not been so egregious as 
to satisfy the legal standard. Child protective agencies, lawyers (in- 
cluding lawyers for children), and judges, too, are under the spell of 
parental rights, frequently to the detriment of children. 
This article explains why the cultural norm and legal doctrine of 
parents' rights is illegitimate, and why they should be abandoned in 
favor of norms requiring that parents meet high standards of care. It 
shows that parents' rights are incompatible with well-established 
moral and legal principles that stand on a firmer theoretical foun- 
dat ion-pr inciples regarding the nature and purpose of individual 
rights, respect for persons, and society's obligation to persons unable 
independently to further their own interests. Consistent with these 
other principles, children alone should be accorded rights in connec- 
tion with their upbringing, and those rights should include a claim on 
the rest of society to ensure that persons who enjoy the privilege of 
acting as their parents carry out their role in a manner that is consis- 
tent with the children's interests. 
Why Parents  Rights Are Wrong 1 
Parental childrearing rights are wholly anomalous within our cul- 
ture. In no other context does the law or popular morality recognize 
individual rights to plenary control over the lives of other persons. 
Why is this so? First, the notion of individual rights is founded upon 
the principle of self-determination; persons have a fundamental inter- 
est in controlling their own lives, and an enforceable claim against 
interference by other persons is necessary to protect hat interest. A 
right to control the life of another person cannot rest on the same 
foundation. 
Second, it violates the respect we owe to others as persons to assert 
that someone is entitled to control their lives. Importantly, this is the 
case even regarding persons who are not competent to further their 
own interests. With respect to incompetent adults, including adults 
who never have been competent, he law accords certain individuals 
merely a privilege to assume control over some aspects of the incom- 
petent adult's life, and requires that those individuals exercise this 
privilege in a manner consistent with the interests and rights of the 
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incompetent adult. 2We regard the role of a caretaker for an adult as 
akin to that of a trustee, rather than that of a property owner. 
Legal and philosophical writing on the subject of rights clearly re- 
flects this understanding of rights. When the Supreme Court inter- 
prets constitutional rights it speaks, for example, of an individual's 
right to determine what she will say or write, what religion she will 
practice, how she will use her property, what medical procedures will 
be done to her, and how her criminal defense will be conducted. More 
directly, when individuals have claimed a right to control or make 
important decisions for other adults, the courts have invariably de- 
nied that claim. For example, courts have in the last thirty years evis- 
cerated the legal rights that husbands enjoyed in the past to control 
the lives of their wives, and have rejected claims by parents of adult 
offspring who were in a persistent vegetative state, mentally ill, or 
mentally retarded that they are entitled to decide the course of medi- 
cal care for their offspring. Additionally, courts have interpreted the 
Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of slavery very broadly to pre- 
clude any contractual rights that would empower one person substan- 
tially to control the life of another person, even though contract rights 
are predicated upon mutual consent. 
Given the widespread acceptance of, and compelling reasons for, 
the principle that rights protect only self-determination a d, corre- 
spondingly, that no one is entitled to control the life of another per- 
son, there should be a presumption against he validity of any class of 
'other-determining' rights. Parents' rights constitute such a class. 
Proponents of parents' rights should therefore be required to provide 
justification for them sufficient o overcome this presumption. The 
Supreme Court's rationale for establishing constitutional parental 
rights was simply that there was a long tradition of parental 'auton- 
omy' (a misnomer, insofar as the term means self-rule) in this coun- 
try, which is no justification at all. Some philosophers and legal theo- 
rists, though, have proposed justifications for parents' rights, based 
upon the unique characteristics and situation of children, and these 
justifications ring true to many people. To understand why parents' 
rights are wrong, therefore, it is necessary to understand why these 
purported justifications are unsound. 
Possible rationales for parents' rights may usefully be divided into 
three categories, according to whose interests they invoke: children's 
interests, parents' interests, or interests of society as a whole. First, 
some proponents of parental rights rightly point out that children 
need nurturing and protection by others and that the best way we 
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know how to provide this is by supporting an intimate relationship 
with a single set of parents, free from unwarranted interference by 
outsiders. This argument appears implicitly to assume the existence 
of an intact family with nurturing, cooperative parents, and is of lim- 
ited force for that reason. Leaving aside that problem, however, it 
simply does not follow from this premise that parents hould have 
childrearing rights. 
Ordinarily, in order to protect a person's interests, we assign rights 
to that person, not to someone lse. Why do we not do the same in the 
case of childrearing? We could attribute to children whatever rights 
are necessary to protect and promote their special developmental in-
terests. For example, children could be said to possess a right to a 
relationship with a nurturing set of parents, and to be free from any 
state interference in this relationship that is not, on the whole, bene- 
ficial to them. One might object here that children, at least young 
ones, are not capable of asserting and effectuating rights. However, 
such a capacity is not a precondition for having rights. Just as in the 
case of incompetent adults, children can possess rights and have 
someone lse, such as their parents, act as their agent o assert and 
effectuate those rights in legal fora2 Indeed even newborn children 
already possess many rights--for example, a right not to be killed 
and rights to property. 
Another set of arguments for parents' rights centers around the in- 
terests of parents themselves. There can be no doubt that parenting 
is extremely important to most adults, and the most fulfilling part of 
the lives of many. Moreover, parenting is a great responsibility, and 
many would argue that substantial parenting rights are appropriate 
compensation for all that parents sacrifice. These arguments, too, 
however, are unconvincing. First, parental rights are not necessary to
protect most adults' interest in being parents. If, as suggested above, 
children themselves have a right to an undisturbed relationship with 
their parents, so long as the parents do not act in a manner substan- 
tially contrary to the children's interests, then adults would continue 
to be able to act as parents, and to do so with a considerable degree of 
freedom, even in a world with no parental rights. All that parents' 
rights are necessary for is to allow parents to harm their children 
without interference by others. The relevant questions are therefore 
whether parents have an interest in harming their children and, if so, 
whether that interest is such as to warrant he protection of a right. 
In response to the first question, I would simply point out that bad 
parenting and child abuse hurt parents as well as children. The long- 
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term interest of parents in having a healthy relationship with their 
offspring throughout their lives depends to a great extent on the qual- 
ity of the early relationship and on their children's judgment, as they 
mature, regarding the quality of the upbringing their parents pro- 
vided. In addition, bad parents often incur criticism or even condem- 
nation from their community even if their conduct does not rise to the 
level of legally actionable abuse. Thus, parents as well as children 
might actually be better off, in the long run, as a result of greater 
community involvement in directing their childrearing efforts, includ- 
ing setting standards that parents are expected to meet. This is espe- 
cially likely if, along with imposing additional requirements, our soci- 
ety began providing parents greater support than it now does, to 
ensure that any parent who wants to be a good parent has the skills, 
knowledge, and resources needed to do so. 
The answer to the second question surely must be that even if par- 
ents do have an interest in being free to act in ways substantially 
contrary to the interests of their children, such an interest is by no 
means a fundamental interest nor sufficient to outweigh the interest 
of their children in their not being free so to act. Parents denied this 
freedom may feel great frustration and anger, but no aspect of their 
basic welfare is impaired thereby, and most people would, or at least 
should, be offended by the suggestion that a right to harm one's child 
is appropriate compensation for performing parental tasks. Certainly 
they would be offended by a similar suggestion regarding any care- 
takers for adults. 
At this point, parents' rights advocates might retreat to the position 
that, though perhaps not necessary to protect the core of adults' inter- 
est in serving as parents, a set of parents' rights more limited in 
scope than those presently existing--i.e., protecting freedom only 
within bounds defined by children's interests, is an appropriate way 
of protecting that adult interest. Attributing to parents merely a legal 
privilege to act as parents, they might assert, does not adequately 
reflect he importance of parenting. There are several reasons, how- 
ever, why this weaker claim is also unsound. 
First, embedded in the concept of a right is a notion of moral enti- 
tlement hat is inappropriate in the case of parenting. We typically 
regard persons as entitled to things that constitute a fundamental 
interest for them or that they deserve because of their actions. Par- 
enting satisfies neither criterion. Properly speaking, an interest is 
fundamental not simply when it is of great subjective importance to 
an individual, but rather when denial of it would impair the ability of 
170 Child Psychiatry and Human Development 
an otherwise healthy individual to pursue any higher aims in life. 
Food, shelter, medical care, and education are fundamental interests. 
Being a parent is not; it is, rather, one of the higher aims that people 
may or may not pursue in their lives. 
Moreover, it is difficult o imagine a set of neutral criteria satisfac- 
tion of which should be sufficient to establish that a person deserves 
to control the life of another person. Even if Mother Theresa had de- 
voted all of her self-sacrificing efforts throughout her career to nur- 
turing a single incompetent adult, we would not say that she deserves 
to control that person's life. To say that parents deserve to control 
their children's lives because they voluntarily undertook the respon- 
sibilities of childrearing, or simply because they had intercourse, is
thus inconsistent with our general concept of moral deservingness. 
Furthermore, it need not be the case that parents feel less important 
in a world without parents' rights. In fact, transforming our under- 
standing of parenting from an entitlement to a privilege should raise 
the self-esteem of good parents, since they can feel proud of being 
worthy of this important privilege, while the moral bankruptcy of the 
currently prevailing notion that biology alone entitles one to be a par- 
ent substantially devalues the currency of parental rights. 
Additionally, there is a practical objection to retaining even a set of 
parental rights that is formally more limited. Because of the rhetori- 
cal force that claims to a parental right now have, judges would be 
unlikely in practice to keep parents' rights within bounds defined by 
children's interests, at least in the foreseeable future. To move the 
focus of public discussion and legal proceedings regarding childrear- 
ing to where it belongs--on the interests of children, it is necessary to
eliminate parental rights altogether. 
The final category of arguments for parents' rights appeals to cer- 
tain collective goods that these rights protect--for example, cultural 
pluralism and the institution of the family as the basic unit of west- 
ern society and democratic culture. Given the reasoning presented 
above, it is easy to see where these arguments go wrong. First, they 
incorrectly assume that parents' rights are the only possible means of 
preserving parent-child relationships and preventing state standard- 
ization of all children. I have shown, to the contrary, that rights as- 
signed to the persons who alone have fundamental interests at stake 
in connection with childrearing--children themselves--are adequate 
for these purposes. Within limits defined by the welfare interests of 
children there is ample room for a diversity of belief systems and 
ways of life. 
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Moreover, even if it were necessary tosacrifice the welfare interests 
of children in order to satisfy diffuse social interests uch as cultural 
pluralism, it would be improper to do so. Certainly we would reject a 
suggestion that some adults should be made the object of others' right 
of control in order to promote such social ends (imagine, for example, 
if members of dwindling religious minorities were accorded a right to 
seize mentally ill homeless persons from city parks and indoctrinate 
them). Respect for the personhood of children requires that we sim- 
ilarly reject such an argument for parental rights. 
In sum, none of the interests to which proponents of parents' rights 
appeal can support such rights, not even the interests of children. 
Lurking on the sidelines throughout this discussion, however, has 
been the question: Who decides what children's interests are? Some- 
one must decide, and it might appear that by arguing against par- 
ents' rights I have assumed that the state and its cadre of child devel- 
opment experts always know more than parents about what is best 
for children. That is not the case. Even if it were true that parents 
always know best, we should not say that they therefore have a right 
to decide how their children's lives will go, but rather that their chil- 
dren therefore have a right to have the parents, rather than the state, 
decide. But the question of who decides is still germane, particularly 
in considering whether to establish uniform standards of parenting. 
Some interests of children are more or less generic, while others 
vary significantly according to the unique characteristics of different 
children. With respect to the latter category of interests, parents are 
often in the best position to determine where they lie. For the sake of 
the children, parents hould make the decisions concerning those in- 
terests. With respect to generic features of children's well-being, how- 
ever, it stands to reason that persons who make a career of studying 
child deVelopment and who are recognized within their profession as 
doing excellent work, are generally better qualified than most parents 
to make decisions. We should say, therefore, that children have a 
right to a uniform state standard in relation to those matters. 
At this point, some will object hat conclusions about interests of- 
ten, if not always, depend on value judgments, and imposing major- 
itarian values on all parents is contrary to the principle of toleration 
that is central to modern western political culture. It is helpful to 
recall in this context, however, that we grant the state authority to 
establish uniform guidelines for permissible conduct by individuals 
toward other persons who are not their children, even though such 
guidelines reflect value judgments not shared by all persons. For ex- 
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ample, laws prohibiting racial discrimination i  housing or sexual ha- 
rassment in the workplace mbody majoritarian values that some 
members of our society reject, but such laws do not thereby offend the 
principle of toleration. 
Discomfort with state-imposed standards for parenting derives in 
large part from a belief that parent-child interactions are of a differ- 
ent order and somehow trigger toleration concerns not present in the 
case of laws governing interactions among adults. Toleration, how- 
ever, is closely tied to the principle of self-determination, and as 
pointed out above, parenting is not self-determining behavior; it is 
"other-determining." The failure to see it as such, and the failure to 
see that setting parenting standards does not violate the principle of 
toleration, must rest on a failure fully to recognize the distinct per- 
sonhood of children. 
In sum, there is no justification for according to parents rights to 
direct he lives of their children as they see fit and, since such rights 
conflict with basic principles of law and morality, such rights are ille- 
gitimate. Courts and legislatures should eliminate them. Even though 
this is not likely to happen, child advocates should no longer be inhib- 
ited in talking about standards for parenting by an uneasiness about 
treading upon sacred ground or breaching a wall of entitlement. Par- 
enting is a privilege, and as such may be conditioned upon satisfac- 
tion of any requirements the state sees fit to impose in order to pro- 
tect and promote the interests of children. 
Parent ing Standards as a Right of Chi ldren 
The first part of this article explained why parents' rights are ille- 
gitimate and therefore should not pose any obstacle to establishing 
rigorous, uniform standards for parenting. From this flows the con- 
clusion that the state may impose substantial requirements a a con- 
dition for enjoying a parenting privilege. This is all the justification 
that child development experts need to propose new standards for the 
state to adopt. It is nevertheless worthwhile to consider whether it is 
possible to make the stronger claim that the state has an obligation 
to set high parenting standards, or whether it would instead be su- 
pererogatory on the part of the state to do so. Such an obligation 
might run to society as a whole--i.e., if high parenting standards 
would substantially improve the quality of life for all. In this part, 
though, I consider only the possibility that the state has an obligation 
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to children to impose requirements on parents more substantial than 
it presently does or, in other words, that children have a right to rela- 
tively demanding parenting standards. 
When a child enters the world, what claims does she have on the 
rest of society? I believe the strongest response to that question would 
rest upon an appeal to the well-established political and legal princi- 
ple of equality among persons. The political principle holds that a 
society's governing institutions must give equal consideration to the 
interests of all persons in establishing laws and policies, and must 
distribute any benefits it bestows equally among all persons unless 
there are reasons, based upon neutral, impartial principles, for an 
unequal distribution. The legal principle which partially embodies 
this political principle is set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause and the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause. It holds that the states and the federal government must ac- 
cord the same legal protections to all similarly situated persons, ab- 
sent adequate justification for doing otherwise. Thus, simply by vir- 
tue of being a person, a child has a claim on the rest of society to 
equal consideration i decision-making and, absent special justifica- 
tion, equal treatment by the law. 
Using the equality principle, it is a relatively simple matter to ar- 
gue for a number of particular ights for children, and these rights 
can in turn support a number of state-imposed requirements for par- 
ents. Certainly children have an equal claim to many of the same 
negative rights (i.e., rights to others' forbearance from certain ac- 
tions) that adults possess--for example, rights against physical harms. 
For the most part, children in our society already do possess these 
most basic of rights, even against heir parents, and the state has 
established standards for acceptable parental behavior that reflect 
these rights. The state often does not enforce these standards and 
rights, but formally they are in place. 
Are there other rights that adults possess that children too should 
possess, and that would require higher standards for parenting than 
presently exist? Children's developmental interests and relatively 
limited capacities require that they enjoy some rights--such as the 
right against physical restraint--to a lesser degree than adults. The 
equality principle dictates, however, that, as in the case of adults who 
have diminished capacities, children's enjoyment of such rights be re- 
duced only to the extent hat is necessary to protect heir interests or 
to prevent hem from causing physical harm to others. This conclu- 
sion has some quite radical implications. 
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One implication is that many restraints that some parents and 
their proxies (e.g., private schools) presently impose on children's ba- 
sic liberties--their freedom of thought, expression, and movement-- 
violate the rights of the children, and the state therefore has an obli- 
gation to prevent such practices. It would therefore be appropriate to 
set standards for acceptable parental restrictions on children's liber- 
ties, based upon the best available vidence regarding the relation- 
ship between children's intellectual, moral, and physical freedom and 
their developmental interests. Such standards would surely be more 
stringent than those now in place. 
Another, even more far-reaching, implication is that the state itself 
violates the rights of children whenever it forces them into an asso- 
ciation that is not in their best interests. Adults enjoy a right not to 
be forced into association with anyone, absent conduct on their part 
that justifies doing so (e.g., criminal behavior may justify forced as- 
sociation with other criminals in a prison). Children, too, should enjoy 
a right against forced association, particularly when they are old 
enough to make a meaningful choice about with whom they want to 
associate, except insofar as placing them in a relationship that is in- 
voluntary on their part is in their interests or is necessary toprevent 
them from physically harming others. 
From this it follows that the state violates the rights of children 
when it forces them into a relationship with a parent hat is, on the 
whole, not in their interests. The state does effectively impose rela- 
tionships on children, by establishing who has custody of them. More- 
over, the state routinely and deliberately forces some children into 
relationships with parents whom the state knows to be bad parents, 
when it grants custody and/or visitation to a parent who is abusive 
but not sufficiently so to satisfy the existing legal standard for termi- 
nation of parental rights. As noted at the outset, the mental health 
profession has by and large been complicit in this practice. 
The associational rights of children would appear to require, how- 
ever, that the state ensure at a minimum that any relationship in 
which it places children is, on the whole, in their best interests. This 
in turn suggests that the state has an obligation to children to estab- 
lish standards for parenting set at least at the level where failure to 
satisfy them would mean that the child would be better off if the state 
limited or terminated contact with the parent. This level would, I be- 
lieve, be sufficiently high to prohibit serious psychological nd emo- 
tional, as well as physical and sexual, mistreatment of children. 
Is it possible to go even further and claim that children have a right 
James G. Dwyer 175 
to still higher standards of parenting? The more common situation of 
children is not one in which they would be better off being removed 
from their parents' custody, but rather one in which their parents are 
simply not particularly good parents, because they are not as nurtur- 
ing and considerate of, or knowledgeable about, their children's needs 
as perhaps they should be. In these cases, the parents' conduct is 
generally not such as would violate anyone's rights if directed toward 
other adults. For example, demeaning one's child or giving one's child 
an unhealthy diet, inappropriate clothing, and an unstimulating envi- 
ronment are bad parenting practices, but would not appear to violate 
any rights that are common to all persons. It therefore would be nec- 
essary to justify special rights for children in order to conclude that 
the state has an obligation to condemn and try to prevent such prac- 
tices. 
Here, too, the equality principle does a lot of work, this time by 
comparing the situation of children ot with that of adults generally, 
but rather with that of other vulnerable populations. In our society, 
numerous laws guarantee groups of vulnerable adults special protec- 
tions and benefits. In addition to ensuring members of these groups 
satisfaction of their basic material needs, laws impose trustee-like du- 
ties on persons who act as decision-makers and care-takers for elderly 
persons, mentally ill persons, and mentally retarded persons, requir- 
ing that they act and make decisions concerning the incompetent per- 
son's life in accordance with that person's wishes, to the extent hese 
are not clearly irrational, and otherwise in accordance with the in- 
competent person's best interests. The state may penalize them if 
they are negligent in carrying out their duties. Insofar as children 
suffer from a similar inability to act independently to further their 
interests, they are entitled to the same state guarantee ofcompetence 
and diligence on the part of their caretakers. The equality principle 
thus generates the conclusion that children have a right to parenting 
standards set at a level as high as that under which other fiduciaries 
operate, and that level is surely much higher than that of existing 
legal requirements for parents. 
A final conclusion that the equality principle yields in connection 
with standard-setting for parenting is that every child also has a 
right to the same state-conferred protections and benefits that other 
children receive (I leave aside here the question whether children 
should have a right to roughly equal social circumstances). Courts 
have recognized this formal right to a limited extent, most notably in 
the substantive context of public education (e.g., Brown v. Board of 
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Education). In view of this right, if the state imposes any standards 
for parenting, it must apply those standards to all children equally, 
unless it is not in some children's interests, as defined by the state 
(recall the discussion above regarding who decides what are children's 
interests), to have their parents ubject o the standards. 
Many existing state and federal aws that set forth parental obliga- 
tions, such as a duty to secure for children appropriate medical care 
or schooling that satisfies certain prerequisites, exempt parents who 
have religious objections to those obligations. These exemptions 
violate the equal protection rights of the children of the exempted 
parents and should be deemed constitutionally invalid. 4Likewise, a 
religious exemption to any new parenting standards that child devel- 
opment experts propose would be incompatible with the equality prin- 
ciple. 
Conclusion 
Arguing for elimination of parental rights and imposition of rig- 
orous standards for parenting might appear to be parent-bashing. It 
is not. It reflects simply a desire to elevate children to a position of 
equal moral standing in our society and to give them their due. Any- 
one concerned with the welfare of children should also be very pro- 
parent, in the sense of endorsing public support for parents ufficient 
to ensure that, as far as possible, parents who want to be good par- 
ents are able to acquire the skills, knowledge, and resources neces- 
sary to be good parents. Knowing what it means to be a good parent 
is a prerequisite to providing the proper support, and the project of 
discussing and drafting clear parenting standards is directed toward 
that end. 
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